Russia's Plot to Cut West's Internet Exposed!

In June, Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s Security Council deputy chairman, issued a chilling warning to the world. The undersea cables that facilitate global communications had, in his view, become fair game for Russian attacks. This declaration came on the heels of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline explosion, which Russian officials believe was orchestrated by the West, although recent reports hint at Ukrainian involvement.

Medvedev’s ominous message on Telegram made it clear: “If we proceed from the proven complicity of Western countries in blowing up the Nord Streams, then we have no constraints – even moral – left to prevent us from destroying the ocean floor cable communications of our enemies.” Known for his provocative rhetoric, Medvedev’s words were seen by some as more than mere bluster.

The global network of undersea fiber-optic cables, responsible for transferring data across continents, is not immune to attacks from hostile nations like Russia. This vulnerability was underscored in a recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In May, NATO’s intelligence chief, David Cattler, warned that Russia might target these cables as retaliation for Western support of Ukraine in its ongoing conflict with Russia. The prospect of such an attack has NATO strategists on high alert.

A significant disruption to these cables would have far-reaching consequences, wiping out critical internet services that economies depend on, including communications, financial transactions, and entertainment streaming. The fragility of this infrastructure was highlighted in 2023 when a telecommunications cable under the Baltic Sea suffered damage due to “external force or tampering,” according to Sweden’s Minister for Civil Defense, Carl-Oskar Bohlin. Although details were sparse, the incident raised alarms.

Adding to the concerns, NATO has ramped up aircraft patrols near Ireland’s coast, responding to the increased activity of Russian submarines in the area, as reported by The Sunday Times.

Russia’s potential threat isn’t limited to undersea cables. Recent accusations have surfaced that Russia has been meddling with GPS navigation systems, causing disruptions in commercial airline routes. In April, flights from Helsinki to Tartu, Estonia, were grounded for a month due to these interferences.

Melanie Garson, an international security expert at University College London, described this as part of Russia’s “gray zone” tactics—covert operations that stop short of open warfare. “Russia has long been developing this capability and it is currently a cheap and effective way of malicious gray-zone interference,” Garson explained. The increasing reliance on connectivity and space data for various sectors, from agriculture to food delivery, makes these tactics even more impactful.

For over a century, the world has relied on underwater cables for data transmission. Originally used for telegraph signals and later for telephone calls, these cables now stretch about 745,000 miles and are crucial for transmitting 95% of the world’s international data. Robert Dover, an international security professor at Hull University in the UK, noted that these cables have long been recognized as potential military targets, with both the US and USSR monitoring them during the Cold War.

Fiber-optic cables on the floor of the Mediterranean Sea. The vast network of undersea cables that transfer data between continents is vulnerable to attack by hostile powers.

As dependence on the internet has grown, so has the importance of these cables. Dover emphasized, “The growth in electronic communications has made the undersea cables—vital for international communications, the internet, finance, and so on—a point of vulnerability for nations who use them extensively and for those who don’t publicly have an obvious fallback position.”

Similarly, GPS signals, essential for aviation, are increasingly at risk. Although planes have backup systems for navigation, officials in the Baltic region have raised concerns that disrupted GPS signals could still endanger flights.

During its conflict with Ukraine, Russia has enhanced its electronic-warfare capabilities, allowing it to scramble GPS signals used by missiles and drones remotely. This capability has already affected commercial aviation in Eastern and Northern Europe, and analysts believe Russia is sending a strong signal to the West.

In response to these threats, NATO has begun implementing measures to protect undersea cables. However, Garson warns that these efforts are insufficient. “Countries need to not only take measures to protect but also to make sure that the communications system is resilient, e.g., with robust alternatives,” she said.

Garson pointed out that satellites transmitting GPS data often lack protection against interference, and the responsibility for safeguarding undersea cables largely falls on the private companies that own and maintain them. “It’s key to visualize these strategic futures and have a clear resilience plan that accounts for potential systemic risk and to keep countries operational if key comms infrastructure is compromised,” Garson added.

A fence runs along the Lithuanian border with the Russian semi-exclave of Kaliningrad. Earlier this year, sources of interference were located near St. Petersburg, Kaliningrad, and Pskov.

The CSIS report called for increased international cooperation to coordinate a response to potential cable sabotage. It highlighted the complexity of the current legal framework, which makes it difficult to hold perpetrators accountable when cables are attacked in international waters.

As the threat from Russia looms, it’s clear that the global community must take swift action to protect these critical infrastructures. Without a robust backup plan, the very systems that underpin modern life could be at risk.